On Equilibrium Existence in Payoff Secure Games
Анотація
We propose a single framework for studying the existence of approximate and exact pure strategy equilibria in payoff secure games. Central to the framework is the notion of a multivalued mapping with the local intersection property. By means of the Fan-Browder collective fixed point theorem, we first show an approximate equilibrium existence theorem that covers a number of known games. Then a short proof of Reny’s (Econometrica, Vol. 67, pp. 1029-1056, 1999) equilibrium existence theorem is provided for payoff secure games with metrizable strategy spaces. We also give a simple proof of Reny’s theorem in its general form for metric games in an appendix for the sake of completeness.
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