A Cooperative Network Packing Game with Simple Paths
Анотація
We consider a cooperative packing game in which the characteristic function is defined as the maximum number of independent simple paths of a fixed length included in a given coalition. The conditions under which the core exists in this game are established, and its form is obtained. For several particular graphs, the explicit form of the core is presented.
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