Solutions for Zero-Sum Two-Player Games with Noncompact Decision Sets
Анотація
This paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of solutions for two-person zero-sum games with possibly noncompact decision sets for both players. Payoff functions may be unbounded, and we do not assume any convexity/concavity-type conditions. For such games expected payoff may not exist for some pairs of strategies. The results of the paper imply several classic results, and they are illustrated with the number guessing game. The paper also provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a value and solutions for each player.
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